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.•<&,Utah corporation, and CLAUDE D.

,, ORMAN, an individual,
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vs.
I HARMAN and LILA. HARMAN,
.' ·.wife, and WILLIAM BLAKE HAR. , a/k/a BLAKE HARMAN ud'
t'OLLEEN HA~MON, his wife,
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APPELLANTS' JWIEI•'
STATE.MEN'l' OF THE Kl.\'D OF

l'.\~E

This action is set out in two causPs or action. Th
First Cause of Action is a suit to quid tit!P in the plan:
tiff Claude D. Harman and his snccpssors in intt'l''""'
to the land in <1uestion located in Salt Lake Count;. rtali
being a part of the Southwt•st quartPr of Sl·dio11 ~!1.
TownshiIJ 1 South, Range 1 \Vest, Salt Lake Ba~l' a11u
:Meridian. (R. 14-15)
The Second Cause of Action asks the Court !t 'ti
aside and declare null and void certain deeds under \rhicli
the defendants claim an interest in subject pro1wrty on
the ground that there was no delivery, and on the a1l·
ditional ground that the deeds \n·n• intended to tak 1•
effect only upon the death of plaintiff Claud<> D. llarwan.
and were an attempt to make a tPstarn<>ntar.1· dispos 1·
tion of the property, and did not c0111pl;· \rith tlH' l'l'
c1uirements for a testamentary dispositi 011. ( H. J3-li)
1

DlSPOSI'rIOX I:N' LO\YEH

l'OU~T

The District Court granted defendants' Jllotiun 111 '
summarv
iud<rment
dismissinrr
lJlaintiffs' eornplaint •
~
0
'
0
no cause of action. ( R 33) Plain ti fi"; appt'<d J'rolll 'u('h
judgment.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek revPrsal of tlw Distriet Court's sulll·
·clguwn t·, cl'1srn1ssmg
· ·
· t'f'i'
mary JU
p lam
1 s·· cowp la1'11t
· ' anrlw

3
qiwst judgment m tlt('ir favor voiding said deeds as a

niattl'r of law, or that failing, vlaintiffs request an order
rrn1andi11g said aetion to the District Court for a trial
or thv issues.
~TATE~lENT

OF FACTS

l'iaintiff Claude D. Harman, since the year 1930,
lias lw\n the O"\\·ner and in possession of two parcels of
property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
one of which has tlw general address of 3966 West 3500
South, Uranger, Utah, consisting of 11,4 acres of ground,
and fronts on 3500 South Street. (R. JO, p. 2 - Lines 18-25)
There was a small, modest frame home constructed on
this parcel in the early 1930's in which the plaintiff
Claude D. Harman has lived since its construction to
<late, ·with his wife, until her death in approximately 1942
and in which the family was raised until they left home.
The other parl'el of property is approxmately 8% acres
of land and lies Northeast of the 11,4 acre parcel. (R. 43,
Ji. 3 - Line:-; 18-22; p. 13 - Lines 21-25)

~n 19-t! th.e plai~tifff Claude D. Harman, t~en a

indo.ver with four children, all of whom were mmors,
ill. -±0, p. 3 - Lines 1-3; p. J - Lines 12-13) was encouraged by his brother and sister-in-law to make arrange-

rnents so that in the event of his death his property
would be divided equally among his children and avoid
lJl'obate with all the 1~x1wnses connected therewith. (R.
-10, 11· 3 - Lines 1-30)

Hi,, brother and siskr-in-law, Franklin Hannan and

br pJ#i1YJ h,'s frorr+

r

4

hi~ wif/ M~rian, i:l~gge::;_k<l tl,1at

i:5Ueh eoul<l be acc 0111 .
phshcd.1rn lm; and h18 cluldren 1:5 nauw:,;, a:' joint tenant,,
(R. -±0, p. 3 - Line8 20-28). Plaintiff Claude D. Harman.
following the in::5truction of Franklin Hannan, and be.
lieving that thereby he would retain eomplctP ownership
and control of said property and provide for tht> passing
of it to his children upon hil:l death, executed a dPPd to
Yranklin Hannan ( R 41 p. 13 - LinPl:l G-2f>: H. +lJ. p. +,
Lines lG-19; p. 10 - Lim•1:5 23-30; p. 13 - Lines 1~-15:
p. 5 - Lines 13-19) and Franklin Han nan, as strawman,
executed a deed as grantor to Claude D. Hannan and
his minor children : Barbara Louis(' J [arman, Blah
Harman, Don Harman and Larry 11 arman, g-rantePs, as
joint tenants and not as tenants in eom111011. (R. -±IJ,
p. 3 - Lines 10-11) These deed::; were ncn·r <lt:>liwred
by Claude D. Harman to his children or any other per·
son ( R. -±0, p. 8 - Lines 3-5), but somehow Wl'l'P rPcorded
without the knowledge or consL•nt of the plaintiff l'lamk
D. Harman. (R. -±0, p. lG - Line::; 11-15) Plaintiff Claude
D. Harman continued to live on the home property and
possess both of said parce~s, exereising all the rights of
_ownership, paid all of the taxes on said property, (R. 111.
p. 4 - Lines 28-29) paid for all upkeep and maintenancE
expenses, (R. 40, p. 4 - Line 30, p. 5 - Linr 1) and in
lu iwh
·
every way treated the lJroperty as berng
l~xc
his. On the other hand, the def endanti:l Don Harman and
Blake Harman and the othPr children of Claude D. Har·
man contributed nothincr to maintaining the property.
'
~
~
l
They were {)Vt~n paid hy their f'atlwr for all (']lores an.:
work performed by them in and on tlw property. (R. L,
0
0

•

5
11 . !I . Li111·" i:;-:;1J a11d p. I 11 Lin•· 1 : H. -t:;, p. -t, Lirws
]:,:.:;tJJ. l,.urtlt(')', tlw •·l1ildn·11 at all ti11}(',; treat<'<l and
nfrn1·1l ti) tl1•· [!1'•1p1·rty a:-: !wing- c•xf'lu:-:iY<·ly their fatl!i'l'·~. F(Jr 1·xa11qiJ,., i11 EJ:J~J d<·frndant Don Harman
1·1·1 1 1w~ll1l J1i,., J'ath1·r to prnYid1· him \\ ith seeurity so
that 111· 1·1·L111l purdia,_,. a :-<l'lTif'<' :-:tation business from
L1111 l'acl..:ard. l'Jaintiff Claude• D. 11arnian t•xeeuted a
i1111rt!.:;aµ•· t(J ::\1 r. l 'al'kard 1·0\·•·ring both of said pareeb.
rR +11. p. 1; - Lin•·=' 1-l~J) ~\ltl1oug-1t all of the d1ildren
111·1l' a\\ an· of tlH· transaction, 1101w ohjedPd to the mort~ag:r· and num· tl1ougl1t it rn•r·1·:-::-:ary that they sign. Don
Hannan dicl in fad siµ;n th1· mortgage in connedion
11·it!t t]u· otl11·r pap1·r:-: of' t]i,. trnn:-:aetion, hut did not
kn1111 that Ju. had :-:igrw<l tht• mortgagP on his father's
11n J 1'rt\· until tl1,· n•1t1· \\·as paid off and the mortgage
n•l,·a~ 1 ·d arnl Ji,. t'ournl tlw rnort<rairc•
amon<r
,,.., ,.,
0 the impers.
IH. -L:, l'· 1l - Lin•·:-: ~'1-:Ju, ll. U - LinPs 1-7) Also, late
i11 tl11· y•·ar 1'Jii:; th• plaintiff ('Janek D. Harman, without
•il·tai11i11µ: 1!,,. 1·nn:-:1·nt of any of his children and without
;in.- .,l,,j1·1·ti1111 11n tl1(• iiart of hi:-: ehildren, sold the one
[ial'ct'l 11 1' land 1·0111pri,;i11g apprnximately 81 :i aeres to
Pancak(', I Ill' .. a !"tali corporation. ( R. -10, p. 1:2 - Lines
~-li;1 Jn ordl·r to cll·ar tli•· n·r·onl title to said propt•rty
111 1 1
• .1J1111·ctio11 \\itli :-:nd1 :-:al•·. (l•·frndanb Blak<' Hannan
and hi:-; \1 il'1· l'oll1·•·11, \Yitl1ont n•qm•,;ting- any eonsideratiun. •'X(•1·ut1·d a 'Jllit-clairn dP<·<l to ClandP D. Hannan
:-l~pkmh,'l' :3, 1%:;, and <ld(•n<lants Don Hannan and
hi~ irif\' a11d Larn I larnia11 and Iii,; wifr and Barbara
L11ni~. I!· . .
..
.
'
.
.
(
cll lll,lJl, \\'ltlio111 n·q111',;tlng an~· eon,;1cll'rat1on,
1
·x1·c·ut
·
· dP1·d to Claud<' D. llanmm Oetolwr
·
ll· l a q111t-r-la1111
1 1

G

+,

1%3. (H.

+u,

p ..') - Lines 1(i-:2:2: p. J l - Lin1·~ :.!1-:llJ)

On ~Iay :2:3, 1!lG-t Claud!' D. llarnian \l"C\s still tn·al
ing the remaining prnp(•rt:-· as IJPing 1•x(·lusin"ly hi~. a11 1i
without obtaining his ('hildren's (·ons(•nt 1·x.. eutPd an 1•ption to Pete Hannan in which h(· agn·!'d to o:"ll tP l'l'!t
Hannan tlH_· said 11 1 aen· pan·•·I. ( H. -to, Ji. 11 . Lin"·'
1-:!U; p.1:2- Lin(•s ;>-lG) l"pon l'l'<fll(·st and \ritlwutall\
eonsid(•ration or ohjeetion, Larry I lannan and hi~ \rif .
and Bar hara Louise 11 arrnan <'OJJY('Yf'd Ii~· quit-dairn d1·1«l
t!H_•ir reeonl inten•st in th(• J 1_1-J- H<'n· pan·(•I to th1•ir fatht·
Claude D. Hannan. (H. +U, p. S - Lin(•s :2:l-:2~)
1•

As was <lom• in n•ganl to th1· .~1 :: ac·n· par1·f'l, Don
Harman and Blake Jlannan "·(·n· rt·qtw:-t('fl to gin• quitdaim deeds in regard to tlw 11 ! a('!'t• pan·1·I. but thl'Y
both refused to do so ( H. -UJ, p. S - Li m·s 23-~S). anJ
this adion was brought in ord1·r to dt·ar till' n·c·oril
title to the 1 % acre pare<·! of propl'l'ty.

A.

POINT NO. I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRAJ'l'TIN~
DEFENDANTS' MOTION F 0 R SUMMARl
JUDGMENT DISl\IISSING PLAINTIFFS' COM·
PLAINT - NO CAUSE OF ACTION.

The Distrid Court grantf'd dt•frndauts' nwtion fol
. <l grnent (1·1s1n1ssmg
-. .
I . t.I f'f' s ' l'Oll i1ilaint on
suuunary .JU
}Jam
.
. t.1f'f' :-.: an· PJ't"•Juded
Hi
tl ie erroneom; eon(' I us10!l
t Jiat p I am
"
I
f'
l
.
.
I
t
sl10\\·
that
.
a rnatt<·r o f aw rm11 pro< ll<'lllg 1'\'J< f'IH'(' 0 ·
. I1 t I Jt• <It• f' 1•Jl< Iants an• t' Ia11111
. .II'",.., '·111 i11t1·1'·
a< l 1·e<I llll< I('J' ,,. I11<·
.
l t .;·11d
l'~t i11 suhjt><·t prnpt•rty \1·as not d(•li\·en·d alll I tin "

7
di·i·1l 1rn.-' prqian·d a11<l 1·x1·C'nb·<l as an att1·!llpte<l h•:;ta1ui·ntar;· dic:tnlllltion an1l is th(·rdon· void. The Di:;rnd l'o:1rt\ ruling ic: contrary to well Pstablished law
in tlw :-;tat1· of i ·tah and if !JPl'lllittP<l to stand would
11p1·n tlH· '!·aft' 10 ,,·holPsak· fraud in that any person
111uld preJ1Hr1· a 1k1·d and daim title to property, and
:ind i11·r"1!ll 1"1nt1•,,ting th1· clP1·cl \umlcl be precluded from
]IJ'(l(ltl<'ill'-'.' 1·Yid••Jl('(' to pron· otlH•l\\"iSt'. (3-! A.LR 2d,
:,~s, .i9:l J
Tl11· Di,,trid l'omt fail1'(l to follow well established
lmr n·quinng it to consider tlw fact:; most favorable to

plaintiff,- \\ lwn l'On:;idPring defrndants' motion for
.'llllllllar;· judt,'ltH·nt. lt furtiH'l' crrPd in not following
l'tah la\1· 1d1id1 <·l1·arly perlllits tPstimony from the grantc·r and utlwr 1•Yi(h·n<·1· of ad:; and statements in deter111ming 11-hetlH·r or not tlw d0eds were void for lack of
1Hiw,.~-, and has failP<l to follow establislwd law which
J1>·nuib plaintiffs to prP::;ent testimony and other evid1·111·1· at a trial to proyp that the deed::; wPre void bei·au~1· tl11·; w1 n· an attt>mpted testamentary disposition
11
llld1 did not conform to tP:otamentary requirements.
th1~

I:\ RCLING ON THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
:'U;\I'.IIARY Jl:DG:\IENT THE DISTRICT COURT
WAS REQUIRED TO CO~SIDER THE PLEADINGS
,\ND DEPOSITIONS l\IOST FAVORABLE TO THE
PLAI:\TIFFS.

Tlw l"tah ~upr\•m1· l'onrt in tlH• ease of La rcre Kid111u11 I'/ 111. 1 s. f,11ri111' II. ffhitc. et al., 1.f lTtah (:2d) 1-12,
:11s p ·) 1 ~·<i .
· .
_
·-< ''· S, ~)()(), stat1·<l th1• la11· m r<'ganl to tht> grantlllg of "lllll11iar>- judg-1111•nt as follow~:

8
"In confronting the problem prt:,;ented 011
this appeal we have been obliged to remain awar'.
that a sm111nar~' judgment, which ~urns a part)
out of court without an opportumty to presrn!
his evidence, is a harsh measure that should Jw
granted only when, taking the view most favorabll'
to a party's claim and any proof that might properly be adduced thereunder, he could in no even!
prevail.''
"See stakmcnt in Samms Y.
(2d) 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1963)."

Bccle~,

11 Ltah

Plaintiffs' amended complaint sets forth bro cause>
of action. The First Couse of Action is a quiet title
action and defendants should have been required to set
forth their claims, if any, to an interest in the property
and plaintiffs were entitled to a trial on the issues thlL'!
raised.
The Second Cause of Action seeks to han~ the dePd
under which defendants claim an interest in the propert)
voided on the ground of lack of delivery, and on the
further ~bund that it was an attempted testamentan·
disposition. Plaintiffs should have been permitted tc
produce evidence at a trial and prove their contention~.
Plaintiffs have substantial evidence to present to
the Court in regard to the two issues, - it being plain·
tiffs' contention that the deeds were never delivered to
the children at any time, and that the recording of the
same was without the knowledge and consent of grantor
Claude D. Harman. It is also plaintiffs' contention that
. t ide<l t11
said Claude D. Harman, as grantor, never m ei
.
.
h'
.
I
'Id
·u11 hut wa>
pass any present mten'st to is unnor c 11 h

9
uwrely follo\\·ing a form which he had been advised to
usi: li:· hrn brother, ,,·ith tlw belief and understanding
that the deeds '' ould take effect only upon his death.

At the time the District Court granted defendants'
!llotion for i,;ummary judgment, the only things it had
liefon· it to eonsider \\'ere the pleadings and the depo,;itions of plaintiff Claude D. Harmon and defendants
Don Hannan and Blake Harmon. In Plaintiffs' pleadings and in plaintiff Claude D. Harman's deposition,
plaintiffs have consistently and strenuously maintained
that tlwre was never a delivery of the deeds under which
ddendants claim an interest in subject property, and
that sul'l1 deeds were prepared and executed as an attem11ted testamentary disposition and do not conform
to tlw t-ltatute of Wills, and are therefore void. There is
no evi<lenee in eithtT the defendants' pleadings or depositions tll l'Pfutp the contentions of plaintiffs and the
ddPndants have contended that they have an interest in
the prnperty on the flimsy argument that deeds exist
and that SU<'.h deeds were recorded and that these two
facts preclude plaintiffs from showing any evidence
ll'ltich would invalidate such deeds. Such, of course, is
not the law, and it was error for the District Court
tu aceept clrfendants' argument as the law and a basis
for tlw ~ununary judgment.
The Court's attt>ntion is called to the fact that defendants in thPir motion for smnmary judgment contend
t.hat thel'e is no dispnt(• as to tlw facts in the case. Therefore, in considl•ring tlll" smmnary judgment, the District

10
Court is required to eonsidt·r thP east· rnost l'aYorabli· 111
the plaintiffs, and in vie\\· of deft·n<lanbi' a<lmL_..,~ion tJwt
there is no contnw('rsy c·om·(•rning fads. tlll'll tht allegation of the plaintiffs that tht·rp was 110 cleliwr>·· and
that the del•ds in question \\·(•J'l• attm1pt!•d tPstamL•ntar.r
disposition and tht•rl'fon· void, must staml a:-: established
fact, and, further, in view of the f aet that ckfrndants har"
shown no evidenee and apparently by n·aso11 of th,,ir
motion for summary judgment do not intend to shrnr
any_ evidence to refute plaintiff's' c·<mtPntion, plaintiffa
are entitled to a sm11111ary judgwent dedaring that tlll'
deed from Claude D. Hannan, dated tlw 20th day of
February, 19-:1-7, to Franklin Hannan, as a stra\\' man,
a~d the deed from l~ranklin Hannan to l'Jaudr· D. Har·
man and his children, as joint tenants, bearing the sauw
date, are void and of no effect, and that thereby defendants have no interest in the suhjeet
B.

prnp!·rt~-.

A DETERMINATION OF WHETHER OR NOT
THERE HAS BEEN A VALID DELIVERY RE·
QUIRES THE COURT TO ASCERTAIN THE IN·
TENT ON THE PART OF THE GRANTOR, AND
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A TRIAL IN
REGARD TO THIS MATTER, WITH OPPOR·
TUNITY TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE SHOWING
THE INTENT OF THE GRANTOR.

The Utah Supreme Court has dearly established in
this jurisdiction that the intent on the part of thP grant.or
is the eontrolling factor in d!'krrnining- the validity 01 _a
deed. ln Firsl tlcc1trity !Ja11k r. /J1trf/i, U:Z ['tah -UJ,

251 Pac (2d) 297, 299, 'l'li1• Utah ~upn·llll' Court held:

11
•·Deliver» is t_•:-;:-;entially a matter of intent.
Su<'h 1nknt i8 to be arrived at from all the facts
and surrounding circmnstances hoth before and
aft!·r tlw dak of the deed, including declarations
of th!• allegi>d grantor where it appears that the
ch•elarations an• made fairly and in the ordinary
course of life. Stanley r. Stanley, 97 Utah 520,
('OUI"H' of life. 8tanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520,
9-!- Pa<:. (:2d) -l-ti3: JlowPr v. ;\lower, G-1 Utah :.?60;
:2:28 Pac. 81-±."
Tlw is~m· in qm·stion in the case at bar is the intent
of the· grantor and the above cited Burgi case clearly
~!ates that the law in this jurisdiction is that the plaintiffs have a right to produce evidence concerning the
wrrounding circumstances, both before and after the
Jate of the deed, "including declarations of the alleged
grantor where it appears that declarations are made
fairly and in the ordinary course of life." The District
Court's summary judgment denied plaintiffs this very
important right.

Other Utah Supreme Court cases which substantiate
this position are Stanley v. Stanley 97 Utah 520, 94 Pac.
l~d) .J.65, where this Court hdd as follows:
''In the course of these various transactions
lw had repeatedly stated and represented that
he was the owner of the property, such statements,
lt~\:ever, hPing admissible only upon the question
of mtent to presently pass title, if in fact, there
had been a manual delivery."

1'.2
See also the case of Clza111{)1:rloi11 1. L111s,'11. SJ rtali
420, :29 Pac. (:2d) 333, wlH·n· th<· Supn·1iw c'oL1rt held
as follmn; :

"The court (·om111ittPd no enor in adrnittin~
evidence of the acts, conduct and declaration~ nl
l\liss Bennett in ref erente tJ'Iihe property, !llade
after the date of the deed. \Ylwn· as in thi, eu~1
the i::;stH• is whether the grantor named in th1·
deed had <-·ver parted with her title, eY1denee that
the alleged grantor, after tlw ::;igning of the deerl.
continued to pay taxes, carried the insurancf· m
her own name, and offered to sell a portion of the
property, wa::; admissible on the issue of intent10n
to delivPr the deed."

Coun::;el for defendant cited to the District Cu1ut
during the argument the line of ea::;es in 31 ALR ~~.
contending that such cases \\'('!'('controlling in the in8tan:
matter. A reading of such cases will renal that ~ithir
the issue involved "·as somethinO'
other than a ddt·rminu
b
tion of the intent of the grantor, which is tlic issue in uii,
case, or the decision expressed a minorit:·: rnlt:>. Th·~
annotation cited in 34 ALR ( 2d) 388, 39:.2, adrnowledgi·c
that some jurisdictions havP held tlw aet and (lt•daration
of the grantor as inaclmissibl<·, but point::; out that t111
issue of intent was not vn•st:·nt in sueh ca:-<·s and coll ,
.
.
. ·] ;th 'I' th1·
eluded that where the <1uest10n at issm· is " ie 1
·
grantor mtendl'd
to make a legal (1e I·ivery, ·i.r" uncondi·
tionally divest himself of title by instrm1wnt in the form
of a dl~('d of <·onv<·nmc<' <kdarations of :-;n('Ji grantor nri•
. .
'.
'
.
·
f' · t; 1t for
adu11ssl1Jle as IJ<-•anng on the vital questwn o in
1

°
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thl· 1rnrpos1· of defrnuining ,,·hdher or not there was in
('ullll'lll!Jlation of la"· an effedin delivery. 34 ALR (2d)
:JS8, 3!J:2:
"2. Although it is \n•ll settled that acts and
dPc·laratiorn; of a grantor made after he was partt·d with tht• title to the property in disparagement
t1f its effeetive delivery are inadmissible when
u1ade in the absence of the grantee, a point conl'<'de<l b:· many of the cases below, nevertheless
the following cases hold or recognize that where
the wr;; question at issue is whether the grantor
intended to make a legal delivery, that is, to unconditionally divest himself of the title by an
instrument in the form of a deed of conveyance,
declarations of such grantor after physically de1ivering the deed to the grantee or to a third
person to hold for the grantee until some future
time art' admissible as bearing on the vital question of intent for the purpose of determining
"·hether or not there was in contemplation of law
an effective delivery."
l'a:ws cited ineludes the following Uta11 case 111 ou:er
r·s . .llowcr (192-!) 6-! l~tah 260, 228P. 911; Chamberlain
1
193-!) 83 LI tah -!20, 29 P. 2d 355; Stanley vs.
"· Larsc 11
Sf(l/dey ( 19:39) 97 l~tah 520, 9-1 P. 2d -!65; First Security
Dank i·s. Burgi (1952) 122 l'tah -!-15, 251 P. 2d 297.
1

(

ln support of the statement the ALH annotation
.
'
cite~ Ctah and California cases as the key cases. The
an no tat'10n goes on by acknowkdcring that there is some
•
0
confliet hl't\\'t>Pn tlw dl·eisions of different jurisdictions
111
regard to the question and says:

14
"But the better reasoned c·asL·~· a:; d(·~i"nat1 . J
" aJ,,,
in 25 Columbia La,,- Heview, :~73, \Yhil'lt nunbe fairly considered the weight of anthorit~:, rn 11
port the rule stated at the beginning of t!ti:.; ,, 1
tion. In this connection, the following n~111arli>
from the law review article above cited l!la\ 111
adverted to: 'To exclitde all e1:ide11cc prcj111hiui
to the guwt after the alleged dcliun; is tu U<!• /,,.
very question in i:;sue, i.e. irhethcr dclil'cry c1::
occurred. That view, moreor<'r, 1rn11ld open liir
door to fraud. By merely claillling dcliury at o
certain date, such evidence of 1wn-deliucry 1rn11/ri
be excluded. A verson ha1_:ing forged a deed co11/ii
keep out evidence of great importance, riz: the
statements and actions of the supposed granlu!'.
by the mere assertion that the delircry 1ws on th
purported date of the instrmnent.'"
In many cases where this issue is raised the grantor
is deceased but the instance case is one of the fe\\' cam
'
where the Court has an opportunity to hear tL·~tirnun1
from the grantor in regard to his intent. The Californi
Supreme Court has made it clear that tlH· argument that
such would be self-serving is not valid, and the grantin·~
testimony should be admitted.
11

See Kelly v. Bank of America Xatiuwtl Trnsl ,\
Sai:ings Association, 2-±2 Pac. (2d) 92:_l (Cal.), in 1diil'l:
the Court stated in part as follows:
.
. . ·heth1'i
''However where as here the Issue I:-- ''
the err an tor intended that the' deed should b'.~ pre ;·
a
.
.
.
.1,
, 1b11·.
ently operative, ::-;uch testnuony IS awt11 · 8 .111
. ~ (''Jv
l'-i.f
P·u·
l- I
Huth v. 1...._atz, JO (;al. ( 2cl ) (i():),
)l ,,,
'
~. · ('\!'
1
321. As was said in Whitlow v. Durst, :W La· - ·
r

,

1
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323. 1:21 l'ae. ( 2d) ;:i;~o. 331. When intent is a
!llakrial PlP111('nt of a disputed fact, declarations
of a dt>ced1•nt made after as well as before an
aVi1·gPd aet that indicate the intent with which
Ji,. 1wrforn1t•d the act an• admissible in evidence
a:-; an ('X<'l'ption to the hearsay rule, and it is
i1m11aterial that such declarations are self-serving.
Tlrn~, in cases involving the delivery of deeds,
dt•daration~ of the alleged grantor made before
and affrr tlw making of the deed are admissible
upon tht· issue of delivery, a11d it is immaterial
llwt said dl'clarutions arc in the interest of the
1mrlJ/ producillff them.'" (cases cited) (emphasis
added)

In order to aYoid unne(·essary repetition the Court's
attention is called to the following cited cases which
~upport the fort•going statement of the law.
8teinkc t. Sztuuka, et al. (1936) 364 Ill. 3-14, 4 N.E. 2d
ii~: Mou,·er c. Jlou:er, (l\f2-1) 64 Utah 260, 228 P. 911;
Clwm/Jcrlain c. Larsen, (193-L 83 Utah 420, 29 P. 2d 355;
Stanley 1. Stanley, (1939) 97 Utah 520, 94 P. 2d 265;
and First oecurity Ba11k r. Burgi, (1952) 122 Utah 445,
l;)l P. 2d 291 rtah cases.
Counter t:. Cuunter, 232 P. 2d 551 (Calif.) quoting
ith apprnrnl from Azecedo r. Azevedo, l Cal. App. 2d
.iu,t, ;iw;, :lG P.2d 1078, 1079, that manual tradition is not
Pnough hut must lw with intent of presently passing title .
.1Iadrnw1w et al. cs. Se.nrner et al., 256 P.2d 34 (Calif);
Solo111u11 c. TValtu11, :2-±1 P. 2d 49 (Calif.)
11

C.

PLAI~TIFFS SHOULD HA VE BEEN PER:\IITTED TO HA VE A TRIAL ON THE ISSUES
A'.\'D PRODUCE EVIDENCE TO PROVE THEIR
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CONTENTIONS THAT THE DEEDS I~ Qt:ESTION WERE VOID BY REASON OF THE FACT
THAT THEY WERE AN INVALID A TTE:IIPT
TO l\IAKE A TEST Al\IENT ARY DISPOSITIO~.

Plaintiffs lu.l\'l' tcintrndl'd

i11

tlH·ir (·01nplaillt

<lll';

plaintiff Claude D. Hannan has tPstit'it'cl in Iii." dPpo,iti11n
that the soll' rea:->on and Jllll']JOSP for tlH· i1rr·parntun 111
the dl't>d:,; under whieh ddendanb dairn an intl'Mt i1,
the property wa::; to avoid the ex1wnsv of prribatl', anu
it wa:,; the dt>elared intent that no tit!<' slwulcl pa"

t11

defendant:,; and other ehildn·n of plaintiff Claud(' ii.
Harman until after hi:,; dPath. Thl· hm in this .1uri~dir
tion, a:,; \\·ell a:--; in most jurnidiction, appear:-\ to bl· 1n·ll
_:,;dtled that the intent of tlH' grant or is tlH· ddt>nuinin.~
factor 'du'never the <1ue:,;tion is rni:wd a;-, to 1d1dlwr H
present interest pas:,;ed or the atte111ptPd

c·o1n-1·1-all1· 1 ~ 1«1

invalid by reason of the fact that it "as an

atM1q11r 11

testamentary disposition. The la\\' in man.'· jnrsiclictiu1:'
is smmuarized in 31 ALR (~cl) 3--L'., as

fC1ll(I\\":):

"The follo\\'ing cases <•xpressl; n·affirw t/J1'
rule laid down in tlw original annotation that 1:
con:,;truin<r an instnuuent in the fon11 of a dctir.
.
,
b
. .
·
]"
"( n• tJI"
eontammg provis10rn; iwstpomng or nm m,.,
11
grantee's rights untµ the grantor's death, t! •
intent of the grant~ as to tlw interc>tit ,r]mh iit
·
mtend1i
to pa1->::; - w 1iet1H:'l' a preti<'ll t 1-rrero~a!Jk.
111
one or an ambulatory om~ to take effrct after '
death - is controlling."
1

.
l
1 1- • not con11 erd~- lwtaU1'<' a d<'('cl 1:--; prqiarec, rn(' i "
.
.
,
. _
- l· . ii"l!l~adwJJ,
trnllmg. 'Jl1(' real natnn' of a partwn ,i1
'
.
.
. . .
·t •1)\\'U\' \i1'
rat!H'l' than tlH~ forrn

111

\\'l11el1

1t '"

ea:ot, rnu:-; '

·
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thf'

decisiw fador in eases of this kind.

In the B1trfti eaS(', supra, the Ptah Supreme Court
uphdd tlw Distrid Court's finding from the evidence
that a purported dePd was an attempted testamentary
ili~position and void.

ln the eas(' of First Security Bank of Ctah v. Burgi,
l~l P. :2d :297, thl' Court at page :299 said in part:
''. .. ThP testimony reveals that the deceased

dearly intPnckd that tlw clet>d and bill of sale pass

the property to the defendant. The facts and cireumstances, however, support the trial court's
finding that the decesaed had no intention to pass
title immediately, but that such deed and bill of
sale were to become operative upon the death of
the deeedent. Fnder such circumstances the deed
and bill of sale were clearly testamentary in charader and intent and were inoperative, since they
did not conform to statutory requirements for
testamentary disposition. In Re Alexander's Estatf', 10-l etah :286, 139 P. (2d) 432."
The District Court's summary judgment in the instant case erroneously and unlawfully precluded the
plaintiff~ from showing the same thing as was shown
Ill the Burgi ease and which was upheld by the Supreme
Court and mmlted in the final dl'termination of the case.

The following citations an• in accordance with the
law as stated above:
iii

1

1'

Ale.1a11de1 's /;'state, 10-t lTtah :288, 1:39 P. 2d

18
-!32; Cowder c Counter, 232 P. 2d ;)31 (Calif.): Jlr:i:
11w1111 c. Sexauer, 25G P. 2d 3-! (Calif.).

The District Court obviously enl'd in grantinl'

"li.:

mary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. 1'1,.
law in this jurisdiction, and gem•rally throughout t11e
United States, n_'(1uires that the Court should han· cui1
sidered the case most favorable to the

plaintiff~ 111

rnak-

ing a determination on a motion for smnmary judgl!leut.
The Court not only failed to consider the case nMt
favorable to plaintiffs, but arbitrarily and without am
justification in law or equity erroneously pn·duckd tlh'
plaintiffs from producing evidence at a trial in regaru
to their contention that there was no dl'lin·r:· of the
deeds under which the defendants elaim an inte1wt in
subject property, and that the true d1aradPr of tl11
deeds was an attempted testamentary dispos1tiu11 11bicll '
did not conform to the statutory requin·rnenb of 1 1 ·~ 1 ~
mentary disposition and therefon•, void. The defendant'
by their motion for summary judgme11t admitted that
there was no dispute as to fact. Thpn•fon•, the plaintiff,
statement of the facts must stand as true, and based
· ti·f"f" :;' are- l'ntitled
· ·f'f s ' statement of' f' acts, p 1am
upon p 1amti
. d grnent vm.cl.mg t lie cl ee cl s m
. c1ue::;,tion ' with a
t o a JU

1

resultin"' declaration that the defrn<lants had no interr'
b
Jd
· t l ie su lJJ<~ct
·
m
property. That f' a1·1·mg, tl 1e Court shou

19
rewrS('

tlw Di;-;trid Court':-: :-:u111rnar~· judgment and re-

mand tht· ca~c for trial.

He~pedfully

rnbmitted,

4~A Y _.\X~l'RTOX,

/~,~/ %/~~jl-~~4;

j'.J{e,rc.tzLf

/J /J!~J
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Barrie U.
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